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IMPLIED REVOCATION OF WILLS
IN WISCONSIN
THOMAS A. BYRNE*

S ECTION

23

8 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides as follows:

No will nor any part thereof shall be revoked unless by tearing,
burning, concelling or obliterating the same with the intention of revoking it by the testator or by someone in his presence or by his direction
or by some other will signed, attested and subscribed in the manner
provided in this chapter for the execution of a will, excepting only
that nothing contained in this section shall prevent the revocation implied by law from the subsequent changes in the conditions or circumstances of the testator. The power to make a will implies the
power to revoke the same.
This paper will concern itself shortly with the exceptions contained
in the above statute and will seek to show what consideration should
be placed upon this exception.
It is quite generally held that the methods provided in the first clause
of the statute for the positive revocation of a will by some act of the
testator are exclusive and that the act proposed as a revocation must
fall clearly within one of the means provided in the section. Also,
on the theory of res gestae, it is held in this state as elsewhere that no
declaration of the testator in reference to the revocation is admissable
to show such revocation unless the statement or declaration relied upon
is so connected with one of the acts of revocation mentioned in the
statute as to become a part of this act. Under these rules of law one
is led to inquire whether or not all possible cases are taken care of.
When a case of revocation is not attempted to be made from a positive act of the testator it is often possible to show a revocation by
changes in the conditions and circumstances of the testator. Such
doctrine of revocation is as old as the common law. It is based upon
a presumed change of intention by the testator due to changes which
have taken place in his conditions and circumstance since the date of
the execution of his will. The law takes into consideration the
changes which have taken place and from these changes argues that
the intentions of the testator have necessarily become different and
therefore implies that the will has been revoked. The question of
what changes of conditions or circumstances will warrant the implication that the will has been revoked by operation of law has been
raised in several cases in this State which will later be examined.
Before the Wisconsin cases are discussed let us first propose a
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
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set of facts and try to determine whether or not the statute would
cover. Let us make the assumption that A makes a will in i9oI
at which time he is forty years of age and his wife thirty. He has
three children, aged seven, five, and three respectively. His approximate worth is $5o,ooo composed of real estate of the value of about
$35,000 and personal property of the value of about $15,ooo.

His

will makes a bequest of $6,ooo in money to his wife and $2,000 in
money to each of his three children. It further provides that all the
real estate owned by the testator at his decease shall be held in trust
for the lives of his three children to be given in fee to his grandchildren at the death of his own children. It will be noted that the
terms of the will are in violation of the statute prohibiting unlawful
suspension of the power of alienation for the reason that the Wisconsin statute regulating such suspension then in force made unlawful any
suspension -of alienation for a period longer than two lives in being.
Testator several years afterwards placed this will in a box of old
discarded papers. This box was placed away in the bottom drawer of
his desk and was forgotten. On several occasions during his later
life he said to his wife and to his children that the old will was no
longer any good, that it was drawn in violation of the statute and
that he wished his properiy to descend in accordance with the laws
regulating descent, but he never destroyed the will; he never tore it;
he never obliterated it; canceled it; or did any physical injury to it.
His only act of revocation was to file it away with his old almanacs
and calendars. In 1928 he died. Between the time of the execution
of his will and the date of his death his estate had grown from
$50,000 to $650,000.

His real estate at the time of his death was

worth about $200,000 and the balance of the estate consisted of mortgages and promissory notes of the value of about $450,000.

The real

estate consisted mostly of old dilapidated buildings all of which were
unfortunately situated right next to a street-widening project then
being conducted by the city in which he died. Being so situated the
property was subjected to a very heavy assessment for the purpose of
such improvement and, in addition, in order that the property could
yield an income sufficient to carry the investment it would be necessary to improve the same by the erection of new buildings thereon
which would cost at the very least about $50,000.

The result of

this situation would be that for a period of about ten years the real
estate would not only not yield an income, but that the real estate
would also consume the income from the personal property leaving no
balance of money. The heirs of the testator during this time could
have no income from the estate. It can also be noted that in 1927, the
year before the testator's death, the legislature of the state of Wiscon-
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sin validated the trust executed in the testator's will by providing that
the power of alienation may be suspended for a period no longer than
a life or lives in being. Consequently the trust which was invalid at
the time was made was valid at the time of the testator's death.
This situation was rendered very unfortunate by the fact that the
two sons of the testator, now aged thirty-seven and thirty-three
years respectively had spent their entire business careers in caring
for the interests of the tetator's estate. For some fifteen years he had
been inactive and retired and the business of taking care of his interests had fallen upon his two sons. They devoted their entire time to
this work and developed no business, trade, profession or occupation
of their own. They were entirely dependent upon the income from
the testator's estate for their very existence. Upon his death they
were brought fice to face with this situation that after devoting some
fifteen years to building up their father's estate they would be now
unable to draw one penny of income from it for the reason that tb,
trust contained in the will was valid and such trust due to the peculiar
circumstances of the estate was a trust which yielded not one cent of
income.
When this situation is examined in the light of the first provision
of the statute above quoted the following facts will be discovered. In
the first place the testator never destroyed, burned, tore, canceled or
obliterated the will in accordance with the provisions of the section.
Because of this none of the declarations or statements which he made
during his life time concerning the revocation of his will would be
admissable in an action to set aside the will for the reason that they
were not connected in time and place with any of the positive acts of
rev6cation set forth in the statute. It is fairly clear that the testator
had not revoked his will in accordance with the statutory means provided and yet it seems hardly fair to his widow and children that
after their careful family interest in the preservation and accumulation
of their father's estate that they should be deprived of an income for
a number of years in order that the will could be maintained as valid.
At this point in the consideration of this peculiar set of circumstances it was natural that the cases construing the exceptions provided in this section should have been examined. It was considered
as elementary that a change of conditions or circumstances sufficient
to warrant the implication that the will had been revoked by operation of law was not supplied by a mere increase in the size of the
testator's estate. Such has been the law for a long period of time
and yet in this case the increase in the testator's estate was the only
visible change which could be found in the conditions and circumstances of the testator.
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In 28 Ruling Case Law, paragraph 145, we find the following statement:
It is generally held that the revocation of a will may be implied from
certain changes in the testator's circumstances from which the law infers or presumes that he intended a change either total or partial in
the disposition of his property. Such implied revocation may take
place from a material alteration in the testator's property or from
a change in his family or in the beneficiaries of his will. The doctrine
that revocation of a will may be implied from certain changes in the
condition and circumstances of the testator is of very ancient origin
and is based upon the theory that by reason of such changes new moral
duties and obligations have accrued to the testator subsequent to the
date of the will.
The question in this article is whether or not the set of facts given
above would not give rise to such new moral responsibilities and
family obligations as to imply that the will had been revoked.
Upon examination of the Wisconsin statute involved it will be
found that the legislature has made no provisions as to just what
changes of circumstances must take place in order to warrant the
implied revocation of the will. The statute merely provides that
the statutory means of revocation enumerated in the first several
clauses of the section shall not be construed to prohibit revocation
of the will by subsequent changes in the conditions and circumstances
of the testator. Clearly it is for the court to say what changes will
bring the instant case within the exception provided for in the statute.
Now the question occurs as to whether or not this statute merely
preserves those changes of circumstances which were recognized at
common law as working the revocation of a will previously made. At
common law changes sufficient to revoke a will were usually limited
in the case of a man to marriage and subsequent birth of issue and
in the case of a woman to marriage alone.' In fact it is quite generally
conceded that these were the only changes which were sufficient under
the common law rule to revoke a will by operation of law. Now, if
it were the intention of the legislature to preserve these as the only
changes of circumstances sufficient for purposes of revocation it would
seem that the exception in the statute would have contained a specific
provision to that effect. On the contrary the statute merely provides
in general that subsequent changes of circumstances or conditions may
be sufficient.
Under the Wisconsin decisions several other changes have
been added to the list of those which were sufficient at common
law. The common law rule that marriage alone was sufficient to
revoke the will of a woman which will had been made previous to
'i re Ward's will, 70 Wis. 251. In re will of Lyons, 96 Wis. 339. Galley v.
Brown, 169 Wis. 44. it re Read's will, 18o Wis. 497.
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marriage and not in contemplation thereof has been revoked in accordance with the Married Women's Enabling Acts and the rule is now
the same in the case of a woman as in the case of a man, namely,
that she must marry and have issue.2 To suit modern conditions the
rule is now in force that the adoption of a child has the same effect
as the birth of issue, with this effect that marriage plus the subsequent adoption of children is sufficient to revoke a will made previous
to marriage and not in contemplation thereof.3 In some states it is
now held that a divorce plus a complete property settlement are such
changes as will revoke a will by operation of law. On this question
there is quite a decided division in the authorities, but Wisconsin holds
that this change is sufficient. 4
In the case of it re estate of Wilkins.5 The question before the
Court was whether or not one K who was named as a beneficiary in
the will of Edith Wilkins, deceased, could take under this will when
he had previously murdered the testatrix without knowledge that he
was named as a beneficiary in her will. The court held and properly
so that he could not take under the will. It is true that the court
puts its decision on two grounds on which we are not concerned in
this paper, namely, first, that by murdering the testatrix he deprived
her of a right which the statute gave her of revoking her will and
second, that it is the general rule in equity that one cannot be seen
to profit from his own wrong. However, it was argued by the respondent in the Wilkins case that under the provisions of Section
238.14 it might be held that this will was revoked as to the provision contained therein for the benefit of K. The court says:
We are not prepared to say that this exception could not logically
be construed to operate as an implied revocation of the provisions of
the will in the instant case so far as they affect K. The language of
the statute appears to be broader than the rule as above collected from
the Battis case, for it says, "excepting only that intention contained
in this section shall prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the conditions or circumstances of the testator."
The sudden and unexpected killing of the testator by K not merely
effected a change in the condition of the testator, it deprived her of
a valid and sacred right, namely, the right to change or modify her
will. Here it must be reiterated that it was K who deprived the testatrix of this sacred right to revoke her will thus producing a changed
condition not contemplated by the testatrix.
In other words the court in this case chose to place the decision upon
dif erent ground, but the dicta in the case would seem to indicate that
21n re Will of Lyons, supra.
'Glascott v. Bragg, III Wis. 6o5.
'See 25 A.L.R. 39. Also In re Battis, 143 Wis. 234.
192 Wis. III.
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had the changed circumstances of the testator been strongly urged
as the grounds upon which the decision should have been placed that
the court would have had no hesitancy in adding the set of facts contained in Wilkins against those exceptions which at common law were
sufficient to warrant the revocation of the will.
In this connection we might refer to the case In re Estate of Bartlett.6 This case was concerned with the interpretation of the statute
containing precisely the same exception with which we are concerned
in our own statute. One of the questions before the court was whether
or not this exception was intended merely to preserve those changes
in conditions or circumstances which were known and recognized at
common law or whether or not new changes arising with the newer
economic social conditions now present could not be added as the
court saw fit.
The statute specifying the methods by which a will may be revoked
and providing that nothing contained in the Section "shall prevent
the revocation of a will implied by law from the subsequent changes,
the conditions or circumstances of the testator" was not intended to
preserve implied revocation in those cases only where the particular
facts were found to be such as warranted a revocation at common
law for what were considered to be controlling conditions then had
become changed at the time of the enactment of the statute, but rather
the statute was intended to preserve and perpetuate the principle upon
which these revocations were based.
It cannot reasonably be argued that the only change of conditions
which would give rise to new moral duties and obligations on the part
of the testator would be marriage and subsequent birth of issue. In
this day and age when the accumulation of a large fortune between
marriage and death is no longer an uncommon occurrence it may be
strongly urged that the difference between possession of a large
estate at death and a small estate at marriage is such a change of
circumstances as to give rise not only to new financial and social
respofisibilities, but to new family, moral and legal duties and obligations as well. If the statute is interpreted in line with the language
quoted from the Wilkins and Bartlett cases supra it would seem that
the exception would cover a situation such as was proposed above.
Certainly to interpret the statute strictly in accordance with the common law rule would work great hardship and injustice under the set
of facts above mentioned and it is submitted that in order to work
substantial justice this statute should be liberally construed.
'Nebraska

1922,

i89 Northwestern 390, 25 A.L.R. 39.

